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Effective Supervision Strategies: Do Frequent Changes of Supervision Officers Affect Probationer Outcomes?

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WITH THE GROWING emphasis on evidence-based practices in community corrections, corrections agencies are looking toward empirical research to guide decision-making regarding operations, effective offender supervision strategies, and policies. In the past, studies pertaining to successful probation outcomes examined employment status, marital status, certain demographic variables, and prior criminal history. Today an abundance of research exists examining *what works* with regard to offender management rooted in evidence-based practices—collective strategies designed to address targeted risks and needs that have shown to significantly reduce recidivism rates for offenders (Aos, Miller, and Drake, 2006; Gendreau, Little, & Goggin, 1996; Clawson, Bogue, and Joplin, 2005; Latessa, 2004; Latessa, 2006). Another area of research for which extensive information exists is caseload size (Clear, 2005; DeMichele, 2007; Jalbert, et al., 2010). Caseload size has long been a concern of community corrections officials and researchers with regard to effective management of offenders in the community and potentially "lowering recidivism," but seldom have researchers reversed the question and asked how being supervised by a large number of officers affects probation outcomes for the offender.

Intensive supervision programs (ISP) are one of the most widely researched areas related to caseload size. ISP strategies were originally developed to experiment with caseload sizes, and were initially thought to be the optimum strategy for supervising high-risk offenders due to the extra attention offenders would receive. Proponents suggested small caseloads and close supervision would prompt needed change in the offender, protect the community, and assist offenders in successfully completing supervision (Banks, Porter, Rardin, Sider, and Unger, 1977). Although there are a variety of ISP models that differ somewhat in their specific programming, the typical characteristics are enhanced surveillance and punitive sanctions for violations. Contrary to the initial expectations for ISP, research reveals that traditional intensive supervision caseloads with the goals of deterrence and incapacitation have higher failure rates *because* the additional monitoring leads officers to detect violations at a higher rate, including technical violations of supervision (Clear and Hardyman, 1990; Petersilia and Turner, 1993; Petersilia, Turner, and Deschenes, 1992; Neithercutt and Gottfredson, 1975). In response to these

findings, the American Probation and Parole Association (APPA) developed a model for ISP incorporating treatment-oriented components coupled with risk-control strategies. The thought was that a balanced approach would lead to higher success rates and longer-lasting changes in offenders, but there were no significant differences in recidivism rates between offenders under regular supervision and those under intensive supervision (Fulton, Latessa, Stichman, and Travis, 1997).

In addition to ISP, other caseload organizational models have been devised and implemented within community supervision over the last several decades, including team supervision models, specialized field and surveillance models, specialized caseloads based on offense or offender needs (e.g. domestic abusers, substance abusers, sex offenders, mentally ill, gang members, and the unemployed). In most instances, the hallmark of the specialized caseload is its small size. For example, many states have specialized caseloads for sex offenders with a caseload cap because of statutory requirements for increased contacts, surveillance, unscheduled home or field visits, polygraph testing, and mandated sex offender therapy. In addition, special caseloads for mentally ill offenders have gained popularity in recent years due to empirical research showing that probationers and parolees with mental illness are more likely to have their supervision revoked than offenders without a mental illness (Dauphinot, 1996; Porporino and Motiuk, 1995). The common theme across the various probation populations is an emphasis on providing streamlined integration of treatment services and community supervision. Specialized caseload programs have generally received favorable empirical support (Klein, Wilson, Crowe, and DeMichele, 2008; Seiter, 2002; Torres, 1997). For example, in 2008, a research study conducted on Rhode Island's special domestic violence probation supervision for misdemeanor offenders charged with family or intimate partner violence revealed significantly lower rates of recidivism compared to those under traditional supervision strategies (Klein and Crowe, 2008).

According to the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, during 2008 there were over 7.3 million incarcerated and on probation or on parole. Almost 5.1 million adults (1 in 45) were under some form of community supervision in 2008, with 84 percent of those being probationers (BJA, 2009). Considering that the bulk of the job of managing offenders falls to community corrections agencies, there is increased pressure from legislative and funding agencies to do more with less. Several evidence-based principles have shown to be effective in the realm of community supervision. One such principle is having well-trained and effective staff. Motivational interviewing (MI) techniques used by counselors with clients undergoing alcohol or drug treatment have spread to the community corrections setting in recent years. Motivational interviewing improves the quality of interactions between officers and offenders (Taxman, Shepardson, and Byrne, 2004; Walters, Clark, Gingerich, and Meltzer, 2007), while the confrontational styles of traditional "counseling" between counselor and clients limit effectiveness (Miller and Rollnick, 2002; Hubble, Duncan, and Miller, 1999). Many community corrections agencies across the country have trained staff in the use of MI techniques in hopes of improving overall outcomes, as they understand that rapport between offender and officer is an important evidence-based principle related to successful completion of supervision.

While frequently mentioned in the literature, actual research on rapport between offenders and their supervising officers is fairly limited, but what does exist generally focuses on communication, officer safety, and successful completions (Ireland and Berg, 2008; Springer, Applegate, Smith, and Sitren, 2009; Taxman, 2008; Taxman, et al., 2004). Research in this area emphasizes the use of MI techniques and how they can be useful in motivating offenders to change, reducing tension between officer and offender, while still holding offenders accountable for their behavior. However, there is more to building rapport than employing motivational interviewing. Robinson (2005) points out that "a growing body of research [much of it focused on the British system]…indicates that both the *quality* and the *consistency* of relationships between offenders and their supervisors are central to effective practice from the perspective of the offender" [emphasis in the original]. We suggest it is important to keep in mind that rapport builds in two directions. Over the course of their conversations with one another, the probation officer and the probationer learn what to expect from each other. The officer, for example, might learn to detect signs of manipulation, while the offender learns how far he or she can push the boundaries of the rules before provoking a response from the officer and the court. Lack of rapport does have an effect on the officer's ability to manage the case, and disruptions in rapport present obstacles in the orderly negotiation of rules for offenders.

Our review of the literature failed to uncover any examples of research directly addressing impact of changing officers during supervision on the successful completion of supervision. It is reasonable to speculate that switching probation officers during the period of community supervision would have a detrimental impact on the rapport-building process, thereby leaving the offender to reestablish trust each time he or she receives a new officer. We hypothesize that the number of officers an offender has during the term of supervision is correlated with failure to complete supervision, in that the more officers an offender has during the term, the greater their likelihood of failure. We assume continuity of supervision with an offender is a key element of success; therefore, the number of personnel changes throughout an offender's supervision period should be inversely correlated to failure of supervision. Continuity can also be expressed by the length of time an offender spends with an officer. Thus, we further hypothesize that probation continuity, as expressed by the proportion of sentence time that was supervised by each officer, will be positively correlated with probation success. The present study adds to the literature by empirically evaluating the effect of being switched multiple times to different probation officers during the term of supervision.

back to top

Data and Methods

Our data are derived from records generated by a community corrections agency located in a large metropolitan county in Texas. The data began with all offenders whose probation ended in 2009. We excluded cases that did not originate in the county, served some portion of their term in another county (i.e., the data does not include transfers from other jurisdictions), or were supervised by a diversionary or other specialized unit (such as mental illness or domestic violence), leaving us with 5,134 offenders. Individuals in our study completed an average of 20.4 (sd=19.6) months on probation prior to termination, with the longest term lasting almost 11 years. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this analysis.

Dependant Variable

The dependent variable used in our analysis is *probation revocation*. Revocation is a dichotomous measure coded "1" to indicate that an offender failed to complete probation during the time allotted by the court and coded "0" for successful completion. The possible routes to failure include: (1) failure to comply with the conditions of probation (technical violations) and (2) the commission of a new offense; however, in the present analysis both are coded "1." Approximately 26 percent of our sample failed to successfully complete their time on probation. On a state level, the felony revocation rate in Texas for 2008 was 15.3 percent; community supervision revocations account for approximately 30 percent of prison admissions annually in Texas (Texas Legislative Budget Board, 2009). Logistic models were fit to the data to evaluate our hypotheses concerning the number of probation officers and the length of time each probation officer supervised the case during the offender's time on probation.

Independent Variables

Officer Count and Officer Continuity

To address the potential negative outcomes associated with frequent changes in supervision officers, we employ two distinct measures: officer count and officer continuity. The first, officer count, is a simple tally of the number of officers who supervised a probationer's case; however, we suggest that the straightforward count of officers fails to adequately convey the degree of turnover experienced by many probationers. While four different officers in succession supervised the average case over a 20-month time span, some probationers were assigned considerably more officers over a much shorter period. For example, 15 officers supervised one offender's case in the 15 months he was on probation before he committed a new offense. Other offenders served much longer periods with a single officer. At this extreme was an individual who successfully completed probation after 40 months of supervision by the same officer. Still others spend the majority of their sentence with one officer only to experience dramatic turnover just prior to their termination.

In order to address disparities in the length of a probationer's contact with his or her probation officer(s) we employ a Herfindahl Index, a measure more commonly associated with studies of market concentration (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979) or ethnic/racial homogeneity (Weirsema and

Bantel, 1992). In its traditional form, the Herfindahl Index takes into account the relative size and distribution of firms, and provides a numerical indicator of market competition or diversity. Thus, we operationalize officer continuity as the amount of time each probation officer occupied in the total amount of time an offender was on probation. The index measures the concentration of time each probation officer spent supervising an offender as the sum of the squared total time-share of each probation officer working the case. Officer continuity takes into account the relative number of officers that have worked on a case and the distribution of months each officer actively supervised the case. Continuity approaches zero when a large number of officers supervise a single case for a short period and one when a small number of officers supervise the case for a long period. For example, consider an offender on probation for 12 months with three supervising officers. If each officer monitors the case for four months, officer continuity will be .33. If the officers monitor the case for 9, 2 and 1 months, respectively, the officer continuity value will be .60, reflecting the fact that a single officer supervised the majority of the term.

Control Variables

Several sociodemographic controls are included in the multivariate analyses as statistical controls: age (respondent age as the time of termination in years), gender (1=males, 0=females), and minority status (1=minority, 0=non-Hispanic Whites). The racial breakdown for the minority group is 55.2 percent African-American, 42.6 percent Hispanic, 2.1 percent Asian, and less than 1 percent "other." In addition to the sociodemographic controls, we also controlled for several aspects of probation cases that previous researchers identified as influencing case outcomes: risk assessment score, needs assessment score, number of charges in the original case filing, and number of programs the probationer was assigned to before the termination of their probation (Lowenkamp, Pealer, Smith, and Latessa, 2006; Morgan, 1993). Requiring low-risk offenders to participate in intensive treatment or programming can actually increase their likelihood of recidivism (McCord, 2003). Risk and needs scores were derived from the individual scores recorded on the modified Wisconsin Risk/Needs assessment tool that is used to evaluate all probation cases in Texas. The modified tool used by Texas is intended to measure criminogenic factors associated with higher levels of recidivism, such as employment status, family relationships, and alcohol use. The risk scores we use in our analysis do not include information on the seriousness of the current offense, in order to avoid multicollinearity issues with our separate felony measure. The descriptive statistics for the risk and needs scores are presented in Table 1. A dichotomous variable indicates if the offense that resulted in the initial probation sentence was a felony. Research suggests that felons are, in general, more likely to reoffend (Langan and Levin, 2002). Approximately 40 percent of the cases in our sample originated from a felony conviction. Prior research suggests that offenders who engage in multiple criminal events are more likely to fail probation; therefore, we include a simple count of the number of criminal violations the offender had at the time of arrest as an indicator of the offender's propensity to engage in criminal offending. The mean number of violations was 1.4, with a high of 36. Our predictor, programs, is a count of the number of therapeutic programs the offender is required to participate in as part of his or her probation. While we are unable to assess the appropriateness of these programs for the offenders, the number serves as a proxy for the probation officer's attempt to meet the probationer's needs. While the average number of programs was 1.6, one probationer participated in 23 programs over the course of his five-year probation.

Analytic Strategy

Our analysis begins by estimating bivariate associations (Pearson's *r*) between our dependent variable, the theoretical measures of interest, and the control variables. Then we estimate the influence of the two theoretical variables, net controls, on whether the probationer's probationary status was revoked, using a logistic regression. In all, we estimated four models. The first model contained only the control discussed above. The second and third models alternated the use of the variables of theoretical interest. The fourth model contained both officer count and officer time continuity. We used common exploratory data analysis techniques for dealing with a dichotomous dependent variable, and performed diagnostics tests as appropriate.

back to top

Results

Table 2 displays the bivariate correlations for the variables used in this analysis. Across the board, we found significant associations, albeit sometimes weak, between our dependent variable and the other variables included in our analysis. For the most part the relationships are in the direction one might expect from the existing literature. For example, age is negatively associated with probation revocation (r=-.20, p<.05), while those with higher risk assessment scores are more likely to have their probations terminated (r=.29, p<.010). As expected, officer count is positively associated with revocation (r=.15, p<.05). Officer continuity is negatively correlated with revocation (r=-.00, p<.05). In other words, the bivariate findings suggest that offenders whose probationary statuses are revoked are more likely to have both a greater number of supervising officers and to have a lower continuity score.

Table 3 displays the results of four logistic regression equations. With the exception of officer count and continuity, the relatively low correlations between the independent variables suggest that multicollinearity is not a problem in our models (Walker and Madden 2009). The relatively large correlation (r=.81, p<.001) between officer count and continuity was expected. We centered the two variables for subsequent analysis in order to minimize the potential impact of multicollinearity (Kraemer and Blasey, 2004). Additional tolerance and variance inflation factor diagnostics indicate further that there are no multicollinearity issues with our model: all tolerance values were above the 0.25 value that indicates a problem; and the VIF scores were well below 4 (Walker and Madden, 2009).

Model 1 of our logistic regression examines the effect of our control variables on the likelihood of recidivism. The moderate predictive strength of the model (Nagelkerke R^2=.271) coupled with the statistically significant model χ^2 suggests that our control variables are indeed significant predictors of probation failure. Only the number of charges initially filed against the offender proved insignificant, but as anticipated possessing a current felony status, higher risk scores, and higher need scores are all associated with an increased risk of failure.

With the inclusion of officer count in model 2, the overall predictive capacity of the models edges up slightly (Nagelkerke R^2=.283). Consistent with our hypothesis, the number of officers that have worked the case is statistically associated with a greater likelihood of probation failure; however, at a 9 percent increase in the odds of probation failure, the impact of each additional officer is not large. Officer continuity is regressed on the independent variable in model 3. While there is little change in the controls, the increase risk of failure associated with a felony status is enhanced when officer continuity is included in the model. Furthermore, the addition of officer continuity increases the amount of variance explained over model 1, and the predictor variable itself has a strong association with the likelihood of failure. Calculating the inverse odds ratio (DesJardins, 2001), we find that a unit change in the officer continuity increases the odds of probation success 2.34 times. In other words, continued supervision by the same officer greatly improves the chances of offender success.

Model 4 includes both variables of interest, officer count and officer continuity, and the control variables. One change in the association between the controls and the dependent variable is worth noting: the inclusion of both officer count and officer continuity reduces the impact of a felony status on the offender's likelihood to fail to a level more consistent with models 1 and 2. More important, both officer count and officer continuity are statistically significant in the presence of each other and the controls. While the influence of officer count decreases slightly over the value observed in model 2, the effect is still statistically significant. An offender with, for example, three different probation officers is 15 percent more likely to fail than an offender with only one officer. Conversely, splitting time on probation evenly between three probation officers, index score of .33, increases the chances of success by about 16 percent, while an offender with only one probation officer for the length of the supervision term would see his or her odds of successful completion increase by 58 percent.

back to top

Discussion

The current study highlights the significance that continuity of supervision holds in an offender's successful completion of probation. Consistent with prior research, our findings suggest that the

offender and his or her previous violation history as well as social history are integral to successfully addressing the needs of offenders and implementing interventions. However, this research attempted to address an oversight in the literature on the organizational factors contributing to probation failure: personnel turnover and continuity of supervision. We find that personnel changes influence the likelihood of termination in a surprisingly direct fashion. First, the data indicate that offenders who are supervised by a few officers are more likely to complete probation successfully than offenders who are supervised by many officers. The data also suggest that offenders who spend the majority of their probation term with a few officers are less likely to recidivate than offenders whose time on probation is spread out over a number of officers. The impact of officer continuity is dramatic, with chances of successful completion increasing by 58 percent for an offender with one officer during the entire term of supervision.

Offenders in our study transferred from one probation officer to another for a variety of reasons. The most obvious is personnel turnover. Departmental records indicate that between 2005 and 2009, the department experienced a high turnover rate among line officer personnel. More germane to our findings are transfers that occur when offenders move to different areas of the city. In the department we studied, cases are distributed according to court of jurisdiction (there are over 20 criminal courts, including felony and misdemeanor, in this jurisdiction) and where the offender resides within the county. When an offender moves to another zip code within the county, the case is transferred to an officer at a different satellite office. The administrative rationale is that, given the limited resources of the department, it is more efficient to have officers supervise cases that are geographically close to each other.[1] While this is a reasonable approach from an administrative standpoint, our research strongly suggests that personnel changes can negatively influence the officer-offender relationships. Critics (Feeley and Simon, 1992) of the "new penology" that encourages officers to engage in a "pass-the-parcel" form of supervision in the name of efficiency suggest that this approach has undermined the rapport between offender and officer that was the hallmark of traditional probation (Robinson, 2005). As a result, they say, offenders are increasingly treated like "*actuarial subjects*: that is, *portable entities* to be assessed and then 'managed into' appropriate resources," which ultimately lessens the impact of the individual probation officer (Robinson, 2005). Our findings lend credence to this argument. Personnel changes may sometimes be unavoidable, but unnecessary change is a disruptive force that potentially undermines much of what has otherwise been accomplished.

Shifting from one probation officer to the next requires a renegotiation of the rules of probation —not in the technical and legal rules established in the conditions of probation documents, but in the social rules that develop between two participants involved in a relationship (Spenser, 1983). One might expect frequent changes in supervision officers would provide offenders an opportunity to manipulate officers and take advantage of officers' lack of knowledge about the offender's prior behaviors while under supervision. Thus, offenders with previous violations while under supervision might be given a "clean slate" after being transferred to another officer. Our findings do not support such an indulgent interpretation.

Perhaps officers expect new cases to be disruptive to their schedule, or resent the additional workload, or expect the offender to be a problem. During these transitions, minor infractions take a more ominous tone (Van Maanen, 1978). For offenders supervised by very few or the same officer over the course of supervision, familiarity between the officer and offender may increase the leeway given to the offender's transgressions over time, or perhaps established rapport actually modifies the offender's behavior. Additionally, the officer's style of supervision should be considered an important factor (Klockars, 1972). Together, these findings indicate that the role of officer continuity is complex and resistant to simple characterizations.

Community supervision is the most widely used alternative to incarceration in the United States. With significant budget cuts, probation organizations must do more with less, as well as provide evidence that they are achieving their goals of reducing recidivism among those offenders supervised in the community. We sought to explore an area of probation outcome not previously examined in the empirical literature, but widely regarded as valid based on common sense. While our findings are consistent with common-sense assumptions, empirical research was necessary to verify the relationships and avoid the potential harm that flows from unexamined, counter-intuitive results, such as those associated with the impact of smaller ISP caseloads. Nevertheless, a number of questions related to officer continuity remain unanswered.

First, is there a relationship between officer continuity and the offense that sparked the revocation of probation? Responses to violations of probation conditions might be mediated by the length of time an offender spends with one officer. We suspect that this might play out in differential responses to technical violations versus new offenses. However, our current data does not allow us to examine this question. More attention to technical offenses is critical, as prison and jail space is limited.[2] Instituting an evidence-based progressive sanction policy and routinely monitoring adherence to that policy is necessary for success.

Second, future research addressing this issue would benefit from a temporal design. Research shows that the risk of probation failure declines with time served. We suggest that early disruptions in officer continuity have a greater impact on the likelihood of success than changes that occur later in the period of supervision. Future research should also consider the interaction between personnel continuity, offender success, and officer characteristics. Are there officer characteristics, such as unit, caseload, education, age, or gender, that impact offenders' successful completion or that predict which officers are more likely to switch? Existing research suggests that demographic characteristics and occupational histories of the officer can be associated with correctional philosophy (Robinson, Porporino, and Simourd, 1997), work styles (Farkas, 1999), and job satisfaction (Jurik, 1985). Beyond issues of departmental policy and procedure, which all officers are theoretically subject to, is frequent switching associated with specific characteristics of the officer? As these questions are examined through empirical research, corrections professionals can implement policies that are evidence-based and have a positive impact on recidivism.

Third, our findings raise questions concerning allocation of funding. Since the relationship between the officer and offender is crucial to successful completions, officer retention must be addressed. This would likely entail a review of officer salaries. Competitive salaries initially attract quality applicants. Other arenas within the criminal justice field, such as law enforcement, offer salaries that are more competitive and potentially reduce the pool of quality applicants for probation and parole officers. Furthermore, the strong relationship between continuity and success also raises other questions regarding expenditures for treatment and programming. Should more money be spent on hiring and retaining quality probation officers, and less money spent on other services? It is critical to move forward in answering these questions with empirical research.

back to top

Endnotes
References

The articles and reviews that appear in *Federal Probation* express the points of view of the persons who wrote them and not necessarily the points of view of the agencies and organizations with which these persons are affiliated. Moreover, *Federal Probation's* publication of the articles and reviews is not to be taken as an endorsement of the material by the editors, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, or the Federal Probation and Pretrial Services System. Published by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts www.uscourts.gov
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Tables

Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Minimum	Maximum	Total	M	SD
Termination % Successful % Revoked	.00	1.0	 3774 (73.5%) 1360 (26.5%)	.26	.44
Age	17	86		31.99	11.35
Gender % Male % Female	.00	1.00	 3542 (68.9%) 1592 (31.0%)	.69	.46
Minority % Minority % Anglo	.00	1.00	 2285 (44.5%) 2849 (55.5%)	.45	.50
Number of Charges	1	36		1.46	1.87
Felony Status	.00	1.00		.41	.49
Risk Score	0	41		11.78	6.86
Need Score	-8	47		17.30	8.20
Programs Received	0	14		1.61	1.77
Officer Count	1	23		4.44	3.22
Continuity	.00	1.00		.64	.31

Table 2.

Correlations

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Termination	1										
2. Age	-.204**	1									
3. Sex	-.085**	.022**	1								
4. Minority	.143**	-.142**	-.061**	1							
5. Number of Charges	.078**	-.068**	-.006	.007	1						
6. Felony Status	.209**	.088**	.002	.017	.110**	1					
7. Risk Score	.290**	-.167**	-.108**	.086**	.095**	.234**	1				
8. Need Score	.351**	-.140**	-.013	.028*	.102**	.199**	.471**	1			
9. Programs Received	.106**	-.075**	-.049**	-.048**	.058**	.193**	.0051	.094**	1		
10. Officer Count	.146**	.099**	-.023	-.026	.053**	.053**	.293**	.021	.389**	1	
11. Continuity	-.112**	-.109**	-.005	.029*	-.043*	-.218*	-.0021	-.021*	-.323**	-.811**	1

* $p < .05$
** $p < .01$

back to top

Table 3.

Logistic Regression Models

	Model 1: Control Variables		Model 2: Officer Number		Model 3: Officer Index		Model 4: Inclusive	
Variables	**b**	**Wald**	**b**	**Wald**	**b**	**Wald**	**b**	**Wald**
Age	-0.044 (.004) [.957]	139.024**	-0.046 (.044) [.955]	147.662**	-0.046 (.004) [.955]	149.129**	-0.046 (.004) [.955]	149.588**
Sex	.333 (.080) [1.395]	17.331**	.336 (.080) [1.400]	17.517**	.343 (.080) [1.409]	18.184**	.340 (.080) [1.405]	17.877**
Minority	.569 (.072) [1.766]	62.878**	.574 (.072) [1.776]	63.208**	.574 (.072) [1.775]	63.205**	.575 (.072) [1.777]	63.310**
# Charges	.015 (.018) [1.015]	.717	.013 (.018) [1.014]	.585	.012 (.018) [1.012]	.454	.012 (.018) [1.013]	.497
Felony Status	.741 (.075) [2.098]	97.013**	.629 (.077) [1.875]	66.159**	.661 (.076) [1.937]	74.888**	.631 (.077) [1.880]	66.671**
Risk Score	.376 (.052) [1.456]	52.941**	.360 (.052) [1.433]	47.938**	.373 (.052) [1.453]	51.636**	.365 (.052) [1.440]	49.143**
Need Score	.701 (.047) [2.015]	226.249**	.728 (.047) [2.071]	238.858**	.729 (.047) [2.072]	239.136**	.732 (.047) [2.079]	240.674**
Programs	.101 (.020) [1.107]	26.564**	.046 (.021) [1.047]	4.672*	.057 (.021) [1.059]	7.534*	.045 (.021) [1.046]	4.401*
Officer Count			.084 (.012) [1.087]	49.051**			.049 (.019) [1.051]	7.042*
Continuity					-.851 (.124) [.427]	47.345**	-.460 (.193) [.631]	5.685*
Constant	-2.858 (.188) [.057]	230.010**	-3.062 (.193) [.047]	252.685**	-2.206 (.210) [.110]	110.852**	-2.626 (.264) [.072]	98.767**
Model χ^2	1052.69**		1101.958**		1100.514**		1323.021**	
Nagelkerke R^2	.271		.283		.282		.332	

Notes: Entries are unstandardized logistic coefficients, (standard errors) are in parentheses and odds ratios [e^b] are in brackets.

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back to top

Effective Supervision Strategies: Do Frequent Changes of Supervision Officers Affect Probationer Outcomes?

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Volume 75 Number 3

Federal PROBATION
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Endnotes

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Juvenile Probation Officers: How the Perception of Roles Affects Training Experiences for Evidence-Based Practice Implementation

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back to top

Effective Supervision Strategies: Do Frequent Changes of Supervision Officers Affect Probationer Outcomes?

1. Administrators also cite convenience and reduced travel expense for the offender.

2. Technical violations of probation account for a significant proportion of prison beds in Texas. This brings into question the role of officer discretion versus adherence to hard-line rules regarding handling of technical violations of supervision.

back to top

Implementing a Diversion-to-Treatment Law in California: Orange County's Experience

1. This research was partially funded by National Institute of Justice Dissertation Research Grant, 2007-IJ-CX-0031. The full report can be found at: http://hssfaculty.fullerton.edu/pscj/cgardiner/Gardiner_Diss_Prop36.pdf